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1
When the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was founded in 1963 the question of human rights did not feature prominently on its agenda. Unlike the Council of Europe the protection of human rights was not one of the OAU's principal aspirations. 2 Nevertheless, this is not to say that human rights were wholly neglected by the OAU Charter since it makes references, albeit slight, to human rights.
3 Accordingly, one of the purposes of the OAU is to promote international co-operation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 4 However, almost twenty years were to elapse before the OAU felt able to adopt a human rights document proper. 5 * The author dedicates this chapter to the memory of his father, Ferruccio Naldi. 1 Pliny the Elder. 2 On the objectives of the OAU, see G. J. Naldi, The Organization of African Unity (2nd edn, London: Mansell, 1999), pp. 2-18. 3 ILM 2 (1963) 766; G. J. Naldi (ed.), Documents of the Organization of African Unity (London:
Mansell, 1992), p. 3. 4 Article 2(1)(e) of the OAU Charter. Furthermore, the Member States reaffirm their adherence to, inter alia, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the preamble to the OAU Charter. 
The role of the OAU
The initial question that must be considered is why the OAU failed for many years to address adequately the issue of human rights. It must be clearly understood that the principal objectives of the OAU have been to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its Member States and to rid Africa of colonialism and racialism. 6 Conceived and born during the Cold War and the liberation struggle, the OAU remained in that mindset for a generation.
7 Account must also be taken of the fact that the States of Africa, most newly independent, jealously guarded their freedom and deeply resented any measures which hinted at external interference with their internal affairs. Indeed, one of the basic principles of the OAU is that of noninterference in the internal affairs of States.
8 African States have traditionally insisted on rigorous compliance with this principle and have tended to regard international concern for human rights as a pretext for undermining their sovereignty.
9 However, the principle of domestic jurisdiction is a relative one, and as international law has evolved, particularly in the field of human rights, its scope and extent has been restricted accordingly. 10 It is now generally accepted that human rights assume priority over national sovereignty.
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Thus African States have been compelled to accept international scrutiny of their human rights credentials. However, it must be conceded that the OAU institutionally has not generally conducted itself in a manner to suggest that the protection of human rights has been regarded as an overriding consideration. Rather, rightly or wrongly, the perception given to the wider world is one of slavish adherence to the principle of domestic jurisdiction regardless of the human rights abuses that may exist within Member States. 13 There has certainly been a reluctance to criticise leaders who fail to protect human rights.
14 The institutional defects of the OAU may be responsible for this pusillanimity. It should be observed that the OAU Assembly operates by consensus; its resolutions have no binding force. 15 Not only was the OAU designed to act only when assured of overwhelming support but a fear of divisiveness led to cravenness. Nonetheless, a question that must be addressed is whether the OAU is endowed, institutionally or otherwise, to investigate human rights problems.
Eschewing official and institutional modes of dispute settlement, 16 resort to informal procedures has been the preferred method of the OAU. International mediation, conciliation or recourse to the good offices of African statesmen have been regular features.
17 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has expressed the view that such efforts still have a valuable role to play. 18 They have the convenience of pragmatism, flexibility, persuasion and compromise. In the context of human rights it seems undeniable that such processes can have a useful role, particularly where the problem at issue is one on a large scale or where there are systematic violations of human 13 rights. These methods remain underused, however, insofar as human rights are concerned.
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An important development at the institutional level has been the establishment of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. As has been observed, the OAU has usually relied on ad hoc arrangements of dispute settlement. However, among their drawbacks is that they are reactive and remedial rather than proactive and preventive. Considerable loss of life and property may have occurred before the OAU offered its services. It was therefore proposed that the OAU should commit itself towards the peaceful and speedy resolution of all conflicts in Africa. 20 Accordingly, the Mechanism was approved by the OAU Assembly in 1993.
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The Mechanism's primary objective is the anticipation and prevention of conflicts, including internal ones, with emphasis on anticipatory and deterrent measures.
22 Prompt and decisive action should prevent the emergence of conflicts,preventconflicts from worsening,andpreclude the needfor complex and demanding peacekeeping operations. 23 However, the Mechanism operates subject to the fundamental principles of the OAU, especially respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States and noninterference in the internal affairs of States. The consent and co-operation 19 The OAU was involved in attempts at solutions to the ethnic conflicts in the Great of the parties to a dispute is a prerequisite for OAU involvement. 24 It is encouraging to note that the Mechanism has mediated in a number of internal conflicts.
25
The Mechanism appears to herald a more resolute approach to dispute settlement by the OAU. At a conceptual level, the Mechanism may be regarded as revolutionary in the sense that it demands a rethink of the rigid adherence of African States to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference. 26 However, care should be taken not to overstate this assessment for, unlike the UN, there does not appear to be any imminent prospects for peace-enforcement which, as events in the Balkans and elsewhere suggest, can only be effective where the warring parties genuinely seek peace and/or the UN forces have the military resources and the political support necessary to act as a forceful deterrent.
27 At a practical level, the Mechanism enhances the OAU's capacity to solve disputes. Endowing it with a preventive role is especially welcome. The Mechanism seems eminently capable of assuming an appropriate role, more political than legal perhaps, over large-scale human rights concerns.
Notwithstanding these accomplishments, it does not seem that the OAU is in a very strong position, as a political organisation, to protect the human rights of the individual. Nevertheless, the fact should not be overlooked that the OAU has taken concrete measures to improve the protection of human rights through the adoption of various treaties and at the same time has made a distinctive contribution to international human rights law.
The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: fatally flawed?
The adoption of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (hereinafter the 'African Charter') 28 has largely proved to date to be a false dawn for the promotion and protection of human rights in Africa. Obinna Okere 24 Para. 14 of the Cairo Declaration. 25 describes the African Charter as 'modest in its objectives and flexible in its means' . 29 Certainly, there are a number of features about the African Charter which have given cause for concern. More so than other comparable instruments, the substantive provisions of the African Charter are equivocally phrased. 30 Moreover, extensive use is made of 'clawback' clauses 31 that seem to make the enforcement of a right dependent on municipal law or at the discretion of the national authorities. Article 10(1) is one such example. 32 It states that: 'Every individual shall have the right to free association provided that he abides by the law' (emphasis added). The attainment of this right therefore appears to be undermined because it is subject to the dictates of municipal law. 33 opinion the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (hereinafter the 'Commission') has rejected this interpretation and has asserted the supremacy of international human rights law. 34 The Commission's important views on this issue, which although dealing with the specific question of freedom of expression state a principle of general application, deserve to be quoted at length.
Governments should avoid restricting rights, and have special care with regard to those rights protected by constitutional or international human rights law. No situation justifies the wholesale violation of human rights. In fact, general restrictions on rights diminish public confidence in the rule of law and are often counter-productive . . .
According to Article 9(2) of the Charter, dissemination of opinions may be restricted by law. This does not mean that national law can set aside the right to express and disseminate one's opinions; this would make the protection of the right to express one's opinions ineffective. To allow national law to have precedent over the international law of the Charter would defeat the purpose of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter. International human rights standards must always prevail over contradictory national law. Any limitation on the rights of the Charter must be in conformity with the provisions of the Charter . . .
In contrast to other international human rights instruments, the African Charter does not contain a derogation clause. Therefore limitations on the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter cannot be justified by emergencies or special circumstances . . .
The only legitimate reasons for limitations to the rights and freedoms of the African Charter are found in Article 27(2), that is that the rights of the Charter 'shall be exercised with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest' . . .
The reasons for possible limitations must be founded in a legitimate State interest and the evils of limitations of rights must be strictly proportionate with and absolutely necessary for the advantages which are to be obtained . . .
Even more important, a limitation may never have as a consequence that the right itself becomes illusory.
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It needs to be recalled that a distinguishing characteristic of the African Charter is the fact that it imposes obligations upon the individual towards the State and the community. 36 As Ankumah points out, the duty provisions are generally 'problematic and could adversely affect enjoyment of the rights set forth in the Charter' . 37 Gittleman hence writes that the African Charter is 'incapable of supplying even a scintilla of external restraint upon a government's power to create laws contrary to the spirit of the rights granted' . 38 Umozurike's early assessment was that the African Charter may well be a paper tiger except for effective public opinion that may be whipped up against the offender.
39 The African Charter could aptly be described as a statist document. The suggestion has therefore been made that the African Charter be revised to make it more anthropocentric. 40 However, lest it be thought that it is all doom and gloom with the African Charter its positive attributes should be acclaimed. A particularly constructive feature is the fact that the locus standi requirements before the Commission are relatively broad since individuals and organisations (such as NGOs) other than the victim can submit complaints. 41 is effectively subordinate to the OAU and concerns were raised that its supervisory mandate could thereby be neutered. Although the Commission's independence does not appear to have been compromised, 50 it has nevertheless been criticised as being generally unable to act as a forceful guardian of rights. 51 However, an analysis of the Commission's decisions in recent times does suggest that the Commission is generally becoming more robust in performing its mandate. 52 Thus Odinkalu expresses the view that on 'its interpretation of the Charter, the Commission has been mostly positive and sometimes even innovative' . 53 He adds that the Commission has been successfully addressing the deficiencies in the African Charter through its practice, evolving procedures and jurisprudence. 54 An important practical consideration that is universally believed to be hampering the Commission's ability to perform its role is the lack of financial resources. 55 The Commission must be adequately resourced to enable it to fulfil its mandate.
Whatever its failings, the Commission was assigned the role of safeguarding human rights under the African Charter. The suggestion of strengthening the protection of human rights by establishing a court like other regional human rights regimes was initially rejected. 56 This decision was justified on the ground that the African conception of dispute settlement is based on negotiation and conciliation rather than an adversarial or confrontational system. 57 However, the real reason may have been less prosaic. It appears there was widespread reluctance among OAU Member States to subordinate themselves to a supranational judicial organ. 
The African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights
The creation of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights 59 (hereinafter the 'Court') with the specific task of reinforcing the role of the Commission 60 enhances in theory the prospects of promoting the protection of human rights in Africa. The possibility of jurisdictional disputes between the two organs does exist, and will be discussed in Chapter 10.
In addition, it must be pointed out that the Court will not be the only judicial organ with sole responsibility for the protection of human rights in Africa. Thus the Court of Justice set up by the OAU's Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (AEC Treaty) 61 is directed to protect human rights. 62 Similarly, a Court of Justice has been established under the Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 63 as has a Court of Justice of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. 64 Although the subject-matter of these treaties is economic affairs, the experience of the European Community proves that economic law has a justiciable human rights dimension 65 and it therefore seems only a matter of time before these courts pronounce on human rights issues. This raises the issue of conflicting interpretations and conclusions arising concerning the application and definition of Charter rights.
The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
The African Charter only makes the briefest of express references to the rights of children. 66 In the years following the adoption of the African Charter, however, the question of children's rights came to the fore in the international arena leading to the adoption of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1989. 67 Although the UN Convention attracted the support of many African States, 68 it was felt that the African child was exposed to a particular set of dangerous circumstances 69 which called for additional measures of protection but in an African perspective. 70 The result was the 1990 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. 71 The Charter may be said to complement the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. It seeks to guarantee a number of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights comparable to those protected by the UN Convention, although it would seem that such protection is not generally as effective as under the UN Convention. 72 However, the Charter yields in those situations where it may be considered not to equal national or international standards. 73 Furthermore, in keeping with the African concept of rights, the Charter imposes responsibilities on the child towards his or her family, the community and the State. 74 Yet there are progressive features in the Charter. It should be observed initially that a child is defined as a person below the age of eighteen years. 75 The best interests of the child is the primary consideration. 76 The participation and recruitment of children in armed conflicts is prohibited. 77 Harmful social and cultural practices are to be eliminated. 78 It seems that female genital mutilation is included in this proscription. 79 Child marriages are expressly prohibited 80 but curiously the age bar is set somewhat high at eighteen years. 81 In relation to refugee children Article 23(4) of the Charter adheres to the broad definition of refugee status in the OAU Convention on Refugees 1969. 82 The prohibition on child labour is somewhat equivocal, however. 83 Requiring States Parties only to take legislative and administrative measures to combat this problem has been criticised as inadequate. 84 On the other hand, the measures required of States Parties is more extensive than those of the UN Convention. 85 The Charter makes provision for an implementation mechanism, the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 86 which, while it must meet at least once a year, can be convened whenever necessary. 87 The mandate of the Committee, which has been praised as 'positive' , broader and better defined than that of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, 88 is to promote and protect the rights and welfare of the child, especially to collect and document information, to assess problems relating to children, to organise meetings, to encourage national and local institutions concerned with child welfare, to advise governments, to formulate and draft rules aimed at protecting children, to co-operate with African, regional and international institutions and organisations concerned with the rights and welfare of children, to monitor the implementation and ensure protection of the rights enshrined in the Charter, and to perform any other tasks entrusted to it by the OAU. 89 As part of the monitoring activities, there is a reporting procedure that requires States to submit a report to the Committee every three years. 90 A potentially significant achievement, which is not mirrored in the UN Convention, confers upon the Committee jurisdiction to entertain communications from persons, groups or NGOs relating to the Charter. 91 This provision would seem to allow the Committee to consider complaints in the manner of the African Commission or the UN Human Rights Committee. In addition, the Committee has been granted broad powers of investigation.
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It may therefore resort to any appropriate method of investigating any matter falling within the ambit of the Charter, including measures a State Party has taken to implement the Charter, and request from the States Parties any information relevant to the implementation of the Charter. However, in formal terms of enforcement the Committee's principal weapon under the Charter is publicity, the OAU having ultimate responsibility. 93 Nevertheless, the Committee thus has at its disposal considerable powers to hold States to account for their failings in relation to the rights and welfare of children. If exercised properly, the Committee could become a formidable guardian of children's rights.
The Charter must be viewed as a positive development on the whole. It does not detract from the UN Convention; rather it complements it. The mandate of the Committee compares favourably with that of the UN Committee. Since the Charter has just entered into force, it is still too early to say what its impact will be. It may be that the Charter is simply too radical and progressive for many African States to attract widespread support since it challenges established traditions and customary and religious laws.
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The Grand Bay Declaration
In addition to the failings of the African institutional mechanisms for the protection of human rights, much of Africa has been racked in recent years by a series of events, civil wars, international conflicts, dictatorial rule, the collapse of civil society, economic crises and natural disasters, 95 which have contributed to the deterioration of the human rights situation. The OAU therefore decided that the root causes of human rights violations had to be reappraised with a view to improving strategies for the promotion and protection of human rights. The result was the OAU's First Ministerial Conference on Human and Peoples' Rights, held in Mauritius on 12-16 April 1999, which adopted the Grand Bay (Mauritius) Declaration and Plan of Action.
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The Declaration is significant in a number of ways. It seeks to integrate human rights policies throughout the activities of the OAU. It calls for the 94 strengthening of the Commission. It encourages OAU Member States to ratify and implement all major OAU and UN human rights conventions. It reaffirms the evolution of our contemporary understanding of human rights as expressed in documents such as the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, although it cannot be said that the Declaration is revolutionary in expanding the frontiers of human rights. Therefore only those provisions that emphasise this assessment will be discussed. The Declaration must be viewed in the wider context of the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of Africa to secure full enjoyment of human rights. 97 Hence the Declaration rightly considers the promotion and protection of human rights a priority for Africa, 98 acknowledging that observance of human rights is indispensable for maintaining national and international peace and security and encouraging sustainable development. 99 It therefore seeks to consolidate and build upon the gains already made in Africa in the field of human rights. 100 The Conference 'affirms the principle that human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and inter-related' and calls for parity to be given to economic, social and cultural rights as well as civil and political rights. 101 In addition, the right to development, the right to a generally satisfactory, healthy environment and the 'right to national and international peace and security' are held to be 'universal and inalienable rights which form an integral part of fundamental human rights' . 102 It will be recalled that one of the distinctive features of the African Charter has been its inclusive nature, guaranteeing, inter alia, economic, social and cultural rights, or second generation rights, and peoples' rights, or third generation or group rights.
Taking the opportunity to reinforce its support for second and third generation rights, the Conference condemns poverty, 103 disease, 104 ignorance and illiteracy, 105 certain structural adjustment programmes giving rise to social dislocation and the debt problem 106 as inimical to the enjoyment of human rights. 107 It calls upon the international community to alleviate the debt burden in order to allow the maximisation of human rights. 108 It reaffirms its concern for the environment by identifying environmental degradation as a violation of human rights.
The Conference 'affirms the interdependence of the principles of good governance, the rule of law, democracy and development' . 110 Despite recent advances in constitutionalism across parts of Africa, liberal democratic values have not set deep roots. 111 Many ruling regimes lack popular support or democratic mandate. 112 Rather, bad governance and abuses of human
